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SITUATION
Fresh budget allocations for IT sector by Government of Pakistan
On May 9, reports indicated attribution of PKR 1.214 billion (US$ 8 million) by the
Government of Pakistan (GoP) for the Information Technology and Telecom sector for
the ongoing fiscal year 2018-2019 under the Public Sector Development Programme.
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As per official sources, of the total amount, construction of the Cross Border Optical
Fiber Cable System (CBOFCS) comprising land-based cables connecting China and
Pakistan for International Connectivity of Voice/Data Traffic has been allocated PKR
52.790 million (US$ 300,000 approx.)  by the GoP in addition to PKR 425.000 million
(US$ 3 million approx.) by way of foreign aid from the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of
China in the form of a concessionary loan.
Current Status of the CBOFCS
Phase 1 of the CBOFCS was completed and inaugurated on July 13, 2018, by Pakistan’s
interim Prime Minister at the time, Nasir-ul-Mulk. Consequently, reports indicated that
the cable was made active for commercial use in early February 2019. Phase 1 of the
CBOFCS has been the only Information Technology and Telecom sector project under
the China Pakistan Economic Corridor umbrella project, costing US$ 44 million.
The aforementioned underground optical fiber cable covers the distance between
Khunjerab Pass in China, along with the Karakoram range and Rawalpindi in Pakistan’s
Punjab province, covering 820 kilometers. The project reportedly includes a 172 km
long ariel backup link between Karimabad to Khunjerab resulting in the cross-border
connectivity between China and Pakistan. Furthermore, the optic cable connects
Urumqi in China’s northwestern Xinjiang province.
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Cables in Pakistan, comprising Phase 1 of the CBOFCS have been deployed and
installed by Huawei Technologies Limited, a Chinese multinational
telecommunications equipment manufacturer. The ownership of the optic cables is
attributed to the Pakistani Special Communications Organisation.  At the time of
writing, vendors for the upcoming Phase 2 of the fiber optic cable in Pakistan remain
unannounced.
Reports indicate that Phase 2 of the CBOFC project is slated to connect Rawalpindi to
Gwadar, a port city located in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province.
Data Services Operators in Pakistan
Telecom indicators provided by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority point
towards a significant subscription to Next Generation Mobile Services (3G/4G data
services) provided by China Mobile Pakistan Limited (CMPAK)’s Zong company. Official
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data suggests that as of March 2019, approximately 20 million individuals in Pakistan
subscribe to data services provided by Zong. On the other hand, data services
provided by Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited (PMCL)’s subsidiary, Jazz have
approximately 22 million subscribers. PMCL is invested in and operated by companies
based in the Netherlands, Egypt and United Arab Emirates.
Data further indicate Foreign Direct Investment in the Telecom industry stood at US$
288.49 million during the fiscal year 2017-2018. Additionally, revenue indicators
suggest a generation of revenue of approximately PKR 488750 million (US$ 3 billion).
Thus far, no direct acts of militancy against the construction of the CBOFC
infrastructure in Pakistan have been recorded.
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ASSESSMENTS
The possible security risk of construction of CBOFCS
It is understood that the recently attributed funds towards the Construction of the CBOFCS 
would be put towards the commencement of construction of the second phase of the
project, towards the city of Gwadar. Given the sensitivities surrounding the projects for
development in Gwadar and Balochistan province in general, it is possible that militant
entities active in the province such as the Baloch Liberation Army, Balochistan Republican
Army, and other allies may attempt to target construction installations and security
outposts surrounding it in the province during the coming year. This assessment is made
keeping in mind the Baloch nationalist groups’ declaration of hostility against foreign, and
particularly Chinese investments and presence in the province. Precedence also suggests
intermittent attacks targeting foreign nationals as well as businesses in the region by the
aforementioned Baloch separatist group.
Keeping in mind attacks against a coal mine in the province’s Harnai district and the Pearl
Continental Hotel in Gwadar on May 11 further reinforce the assessment that the group
would likely attempt to target construction activities in the province during the coming
years. That being said, during the attacks on May 11, casualties included members of the
Pakistani security forces and local employees. This indicates towards the group’s limited
capability to execute an attack on a secured venue, as the intended foreign national targets
remained unhurt. Thus, foreign businesses operating in the region may possibly be at risk in
the face of attacks of the aforestated nature.
Implications on the security situation in Pakistan
Although none have been associated with the project in question thus far, keeping in mind
the potential for surveillance associated with telecom infrastructure and equipment
provided by Huawei Technologies company, it is highly likely that intelligence agencies
would utilize the aforementioned capabilities. The surveillance provisions may be used to
intercept individuals attempting to disseminate content perceived as disruptive or militant in
nature. Thus, the operability of the aforementioned project is understood to have significant
potential implications on the security agencies in Pakistan in association with China.
The above understanding is bolstered against the Memorandum of Understanding between
the Airlink Communication in Pakistan and Huawei Technologies Limited for the set up of a
data cloud center in Pakistan.
Additionally, with ameliorated connectivity as a result of land-based fiber optical cables in
Pakistan, it may become possible for security agencies to install additional surveillance
equipment in public places towards a better identification of perpetrators of criminal and
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militant activities.
Furthermore, in light of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 in Pakistan, the GoP
may have augmented control over operability of online communication networks during
times of heightened civil unrest or militancy thus limiting or monitoring the circulation of
perceived unfavorable content. During the coming years, the law may be used as a means to
surveil or prevent the dissemination of false news stories by the GoP with the use of
enhanced surveillance capability as a result of the CBOFCS.
WHAT NEXT?
During the coming months, separatist militant groups are likely to continue attacks
against Chinese establishments for infrastructure development in the Balochistan
province.
Pakistani security agencies may witness a shift in security intelligence mechanisms
resulting in potentially augmented success in the deterrence of militants and anti-
social elements in the country.
With the proceedings surrounding the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 in the
Pakistani parliament, individual data, and data belonging to establishments are not
expected to be at risk despite the potential for the same given the infrastructure.
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